An Incomplete Picture of Regret - by Jenn Damelio
In his article “Ethical Consistency,” Bernard Williams gives an account of regret in regards to making a choice in a moral conflict. He argues that if a person eventually chooses one side of the conflict over the other, he may then be compelled to feel regret over the thing that he did not do.
He brings up a point of view that contends that if one is convinced she acted for the best, and does not feel (or feels separately) regret for getting into the conflicting situation, it is irrational to have any regrets. Williams then states “Taken most naturally, it implies that these reactions are a bad thing, which a fully admirable moral agent (taken, presumably, to be rational) would not display. In this sense, the comment seems to be to be just false. Such reactions do not appear to me to be necessarily a bad thing, nor an agent who displays them pro tanto less admirable than one who does not” (122-3). In support of his view, he mentions tragic cases. He then takes his position, “that a fully admirable moral agent might be expected to experience such regrets on occasion,” to be a given concession and bases his argument on the following page off of it. However, I do not buy this premise on the basis of his argument for it.
The statement that Williams refutes, I believe can be interpreted in another way that he does not consider. Although, it would still allow him to have his premise, it takes out his “semi-argument” on the preceding page. To make the claim that it is irrational to have regrets after making a choice in a moral conflict I do not think causes one to buy into the position that one is less admirable of a moral agent if they experience this. The following statement seems to me to be perfectly compatible with the claim of irrationality – “You wouldn’t be any less admirable of a moral agent if you didn’t experience the regret.” I think that could capture part of what is being claimed by the statement, rather that Williams’ view that it is inherent in the claim that one is a less admirable moral agent for feeling regret. I don’t thing that this is a necessary result of the statement.
If one were to accept my statement to capture some part of the statement of irrationality better than Williams’ assumption that the claim of irrationality implied some kind of lowered admirability, this still does not strike a blow to his premise on the following page. I simply think that he spends time and space explaining away a condition that he himself imposes, not the statement he relates on the page. I think it can be captured by a inverting (of a certain sense) of part of his premise on the next page: “Such reactions do not appear to me to be necessarily a bad thing, nor an agent who displays them pro tanto less admirable than one who does not” (123). Could the statement of irrationality not be claiming “Such reactions do not appear to me to be necessarily a bad thing, nor an agent who does not display them pro tanto less admirable than one who does”?
He brings up a point of view that contends that if one is convinced she acted for the best, and does not feel (or feels separately) regret for getting into the conflicting situation, it is irrational to have any regrets. Williams then states “Taken most naturally, it implies that these reactions are a bad thing, which a fully admirable moral agent (taken, presumably, to be rational) would not display. In this sense, the comment seems to be to be just false. Such reactions do not appear to me to be necessarily a bad thing, nor an agent who displays them pro tanto less admirable than one who does not” (122-3). In support of his view, he mentions tragic cases. He then takes his position, “that a fully admirable moral agent might be expected to experience such regrets on occasion,” to be a given concession and bases his argument on the following page off of it. However, I do not buy this premise on the basis of his argument for it.
The statement that Williams refutes, I believe can be interpreted in another way that he does not consider. Although, it would still allow him to have his premise, it takes out his “semi-argument” on the preceding page. To make the claim that it is irrational to have regrets after making a choice in a moral conflict I do not think causes one to buy into the position that one is less admirable of a moral agent if they experience this. The following statement seems to me to be perfectly compatible with the claim of irrationality – “You wouldn’t be any less admirable of a moral agent if you didn’t experience the regret.” I think that could capture part of what is being claimed by the statement, rather that Williams’ view that it is inherent in the claim that one is a less admirable moral agent for feeling regret. I don’t thing that this is a necessary result of the statement.
If one were to accept my statement to capture some part of the statement of irrationality better than Williams’ assumption that the claim of irrationality implied some kind of lowered admirability, this still does not strike a blow to his premise on the following page. I simply think that he spends time and space explaining away a condition that he himself imposes, not the statement he relates on the page. I think it can be captured by a inverting (of a certain sense) of part of his premise on the next page: “Such reactions do not appear to me to be necessarily a bad thing, nor an agent who displays them pro tanto less admirable than one who does not” (123). Could the statement of irrationality not be claiming “Such reactions do not appear to me to be necessarily a bad thing, nor an agent who does not display them pro tanto less admirable than one who does”?
posted by Kelly Sorensen at 6:39 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home