Moral Luck - by Kathleen Emberger

Williams argues against morality by appealing to the case of Gauguin. By this case, he shows that there are instances where rational justification trumps moral justification. This is a problem for morality because it is supposed to be the supreme value that appeals to justice and fairness. Therefore morality is not the supreme value people believe it is or that morality is subject to luck and in this admission morality is severely weakened. The problem with Williams’ argument is that he fails to argue why rational justification is retrospective. He argues that Gauguin is only rationally justified if he succeeds, thus requiring some amount of luck to help him succeed.

I argue that when Gauguin rationally justifies his leaving to become an artist is some island he appeals to the current situation and not the future possibilities. When Gauguin made the decision to leave his family, did he rationally believe that he may succeed? If he did then, I think that he was rationally justified. But when he left if someone asked him to justify his leaving, he would not suggest that he will only be justified in the future if he succeeds. He would offer an immediate justification and offer reasons why he is justified. If Gauguin was relying completely on luck then any justification would not be rational because such a choice seems irrational. Therefore, I do not see how rational justification relies on luck. Rational justification relies on a human’s ability to take the facts that they know now, faith in their own ability, and using this to logically argue why they are justified.