Dissing Domsky - by Tom Richter
Domsky thinks that believing in moral luck is merely because of internal biases, that benefit no one (but ourselves), and that therefore we must disregard it in favor of the opposing intuition that there is no moral luck. However, this seems to me to be an unconvincing argument. Even if our intuition that we are subject to moral luck can arise out of crass psychological biases, that does not mean it is the only case that is sufficient cause for believing in that intuition as such. (I believe Domsky shows that our biases are sufficient for explaining our beliefs in moral luck, but he shows no reason why they are necessary as explicanda, and why we could not arrive at it by some other means.)
In addition to this, I do not see why the first intuition (which he basely supports) would NOT be subjectable to the same biases that he holds against the intuition of moral luck. In fact, it appears to me, that believing there IS no moral luck is more-so prone to such biases. The very nature of optimistic bias is that one believes they are impervious to luck, and that they can win out due to some skill regardless of the chancy circumstances. This, in Domsky's view leads us to take the moral luck intuition, because we can escape blame on the hinge of luck. We can dump our misfortune on external factors, and waltz away thinking that we are super-beings that always roll high on the die table. But is seems more natural for this bias to lead us in the other direction. To say that THERE IS NO moral luck, because we're impervious to it. I see no argument for why intuition number one is any less prone to optimistic bias.
As for selfish bias, it seems intuition number one can't escape either. For, one wouldn't want to let other people who were negligent get off scot free when we got slammed unfairly because ours resulted in the death of a child. That wouldn't be fair at all...
How can Domsky explain intuition one, in a way that is not subject to the very biases he holds against intuition number two?
In addition to this, I do not see why the first intuition (which he basely supports) would NOT be subjectable to the same biases that he holds against the intuition of moral luck. In fact, it appears to me, that believing there IS no moral luck is more-so prone to such biases. The very nature of optimistic bias is that one believes they are impervious to luck, and that they can win out due to some skill regardless of the chancy circumstances. This, in Domsky's view leads us to take the moral luck intuition, because we can escape blame on the hinge of luck. We can dump our misfortune on external factors, and waltz away thinking that we are super-beings that always roll high on the die table. But is seems more natural for this bias to lead us in the other direction. To say that THERE IS NO moral luck, because we're impervious to it. I see no argument for why intuition number one is any less prone to optimistic bias.
As for selfish bias, it seems intuition number one can't escape either. For, one wouldn't want to let other people who were negligent get off scot free when we got slammed unfairly because ours resulted in the death of a child. That wouldn't be fair at all...
How can Domsky explain intuition one, in a way that is not subject to the very biases he holds against intuition number two?
posted by Kelly Sorensen at 6:05 AM
1 Comments:
One further comment I had about Domsky's particular type of argument, is that it resembles the Logical fallacy post hoc ergo prompter hoc. Which basically means, “something happens before this, therefore it must have caused this”. This is obviously a fallacy, because I could have lunch before a meteor crashes through the quad; yet there is nothing necessarily about my having lunch which caused the meteor to fall. Domskey’s case looks remarkably similar to this in that he says “let me show you the history and then you’ll know what causes your belief in luck”. Showing that biases precede our beliefs in luck, does not necessarily link them to a string of causation. While this might be an unfair over-generalization of Domksey’s work, it still should raise a few flags of skepticism. The fact that biases preclude our beliefs, does not mean that they are necessarily causally responsible.
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