Nagel on Science and Ethics - by Caroline Meiers

Thomas Nagel seems to want to continuously compare ethics to science, arguing that “one need not make progress at the most fundamental level to make progress at all” because things like Chemistry and genetics do not need to do so. (183) But is ethics really like science?

Science depends on reasoning and evidence. Ethics, on the other hand, focuses on “gut feeling,” and instinct. If a person is facing a man kidnapping his child, he will not use reasoning to decide whether or not he should shoot the kidnapper. He will act on what he believes to be the correct course of action, through how he feels, and what his instinct tells him to do.

This is why there is a problem with Nagel’s idea that the answer to ethical dilemmas is a method of finding a “consensus about what ethical and evaluative questions” should be involved in an ethical decision. (185) In the first place, the idea itself is extremely unpractical, especially since Nagel himself does not believe that any “complete theory of right and wrong” exists. (182) If there is no way to determine right from wrong, how does a person determine what questions should be asked to find the “right” thing to do?

In the second place, as Nagel points out, such a consensus would not necessarily provide a “good” answer, or even provide a way out of the dilemma. His argument for why this is not a problem is “this is true everywhere, not just in ethics.” In other words, because science is often deadlocked through this method, it is all right if ethics is, too. But wasn’t the whole point of the method supposed to be a way out of the dilemma? Using reasoning and scientific skills only seems to make the dilemma worse.

There is an old saying that “nothing good ever comes out of a committee.” In this case, using a committee to solve the problem of ethical dilemmas is a very bad idea.

McConnell on Dilemmas - by Emily Cooper

It is known that almost all genuine moral dilemmas spark questions in our mind surrounding what the more morally right decision is. Rationalizing these choices makes sense to us, we decide what would morally be better so when we follow through with our decision, because in doing so we have less reason to regret our choice.

However, when we begin to reason in our minds, at times we tend to doubt our own logic and reasoning and ask someone for advice. As McConnell discusses this point, he states this as a fact. “His asking for advice indicates that he believes that there is some one thing that he ought to do and he is trying to find out what that is” (164). However, it is possible that its natural for the human mind to always question itself through genuine moral dilemma. It is not that we do not trust in our own decision making skills, it is that we are in constant need of reiteration and trust that even if the consequences turn out wrong, there is someone out there who too, has the same reasoning as you, and in turn, you are not the only one to blame.

Human nature assumes a constant need of reiteration and approval. Though not always through other people, this “advice” can come from nearly anything: law, society, thoughts, experience. I think that it is inappropriate to assume that just because someone seeks advice from another, they must not trust in their own mind. I believe it to be human nature that we seek reiteration and the need not be wrong in out own minds. If someone else believes in same as we do, then we must not be all that off.

An Incomplete Picture of Regret - by Jenn Damelio

In his article “Ethical Consistency,” Bernard Williams gives an account of regret in regards to making a choice in a moral conflict. He argues that if a person eventually chooses one side of the conflict over the other, he may then be compelled to feel regret over the thing that he did not do.

He brings up a point of view that contends that if one is convinced she acted for the best, and does not feel (or feels separately) regret for getting into the conflicting situation, it is irrational to have any regrets. Williams then states “Taken most naturally, it implies that these reactions are a bad thing, which a fully admirable moral agent (taken, presumably, to be rational) would not display. In this sense, the comment seems to be to be just false. Such reactions do not appear to me to be necessarily a bad thing, nor an agent who displays them pro tanto less admirable than one who does not” (122-3). In support of his view, he mentions tragic cases. He then takes his position, “that a fully admirable moral agent might be expected to experience such regrets on occasion,” to be a given concession and bases his argument on the following page off of it. However, I do not buy this premise on the basis of his argument for it.

The statement that Williams refutes, I believe can be interpreted in another way that he does not consider. Although, it would still allow him to have his premise, it takes out his “semi-argument” on the preceding page. To make the claim that it is irrational to have regrets after making a choice in a moral conflict I do not think causes one to buy into the position that one is less admirable of a moral agent if they experience this. The following statement seems to me to be perfectly compatible with the claim of irrationality – “You wouldn’t be any less admirable of a moral agent if you didn’t experience the regret.” I think that could capture part of what is being claimed by the statement, rather that Williams’ view that it is inherent in the claim that one is a less admirable moral agent for feeling regret. I don’t thing that this is a necessary result of the statement.

If one were to accept my statement to capture some part of the statement of irrationality better than Williams’ assumption that the claim of irrationality implied some kind of lowered admirability, this still does not strike a blow to his premise on the following page. I simply think that he spends time and space explaining away a condition that he himself imposes, not the statement he relates on the page. I think it can be captured by a inverting (of a certain sense) of part of his premise on the next page: “Such reactions do not appear to me to be necessarily a bad thing, nor an agent who displays them pro tanto less admirable than one who does not” (123). Could the statement of irrationality not be claiming “Such reactions do not appear to me to be necessarily a bad thing, nor an agent who does not display them pro tanto less admirable than one who does”?

Lemmon and the Logic of Moral Terms - by A. J. Davis

E. J. Lemmon makes particular effort to go into great detail distinguishing between duty, obligation, and moral principal. While erecting his framework he also discusses the modalities of 'ought' and 'must', as they are related to duty, obligation, and moral principal, in an effort to demonstrate that "ought" and "ought not" are not contraries of one another. I believe he makes this argument in order to preserve the existence of the notion of moral dilemmas, as many have argued against the existence of moral dilemmas by showing that the logic arrived at after a semantic consideration of the nature of the dilemma is a contradiction. Though I do believe that moral dilemmas exist, I don't believe Lemmon's argument properly preserves their existence. He assumes all the dilemmas he refers to are 'ought' 'ought not' situations. All the moral dilemmas he refers to are conflicts, in different degrees of complexity, of duties, obligations, and principle. And from his premise, "It follows logically . . . that a man ought to do something if it is his duty (obligation, convicted moral principle) to do that thing,' he infers that these conflicts become 'ought' 'ought not' situations, which are not contraries, allowing for the existence of the dilemma. However, one could not also make the claim, "It follows logically that a man *must* do something if it is his duty (obligation, strongly held moral principal)." I hear that kind of language all the time when people speak about duty and obligation and such. "As it is my duty as a police officer, I *must* uphold the law." Although, duty and the others do entail 'ought' they also entail 'must' and in fact I find 'must' to be a more accurate description of what is truly expected of those who are obligated and such. If moral dilemmas are truly 'must' 'must not' situations, keeping consistent with Lemmon's belief, moral dilemmas would not exist as he finds 'must' 'must not' to be contradictions of one another. "...an explicit contradiction is derivable from the assumption that a man must and must not do something."

Gaus on Dirty Hands - by Jayme Frazier

I agree with Gaus that the problem of dirty hands is more rooted in moral theory than other issues of applied ethics. I think it is extremely important to take into account where a person stands on crossing the boundaries of their moral life in order to survive in the world which is already built around them. Although I agree that the problem of dirty hands exists more prevalently in the political arena I do not think that the problem is limited to politics alone. It is questionable of many people’s personal moral principles to do the things they have to in order to survive, so we as the common man are also forced to rank our principles and make choices between them. This is the point of Gaus’s argument that I found the most persuasive, that to look at rational thought as a problem of dirty hands is like analyzing why people have guilt. I agree that it is a reminder for us that we don’t want to undertake a task that we consider immoral; therefore it helps keep our own morality in check. Without the guilt brought on by dirty hands situations we would indeed lose track of our own values and principles and slowly degrade our original moral stance. For example in my own life I am against the persuasion of unassuming customers in the capitalist market to by products based on the knowledge of a persuasive sales person. However in order to pay for my own college degree so I can make art to speak out against such consumerist mentalities I am forced to take a job in retail where I commit this very injustice to people everyday. I of course feel guilty forsaking my principles for the return of cash, but without the job I would never be able to obtain a career in which I would be able to uphold my values. I am therefore faced with a do the means justify the ends controversy, and the problem of my hands being dirty as an artist speaking out against the very thing that allowed me to obtain my degree in art.