Consequentialism Unjust in Assigning Moral Responsibility - by David Carrier

Having become convinced that morality operates in two realms, namely in judging us (moral responsibility) and in dictating which aspirations we ought to have (moral significance), I cannot help but see Jackson's piece as somewhat confused for not acknowledging this distinction. In proposing a theory of consequentialism, he asserts (to the best of my understanding) that an agent can determine how she ought to act in a situation by determining, via a probability function and a value function, which action maximized the expected moral utility in the situation. More simply, the agent must attempt to determine the course of action which will produce the best moral consequence; once this determination is made, the agent ought to act upon the action she's discovered to be best. The consequence produced is then the ultimate determinant of the moral rightness or wrongness of the action. The confusion comes in that he never directly mentions moral responsibility in his account, though we can guess that it is assigned, like the evaluation of the action, on the basis of the consequences of the action. Even if we grant him this clarification, it seems to me that the consequentialist view Jackson presents adequately answers the question of how we might practically determine moral significance but misplaces the emphasis in the moral responsibility realm of morality.

Seeking the consequences that maximize moral utility in a situation gives clear guidance for what end an agent ought to pursue or aspire to reach and effectively establishes what the most morally desirable outcome of a situation will be. However, it seems to me that assigning moral responsibility based on those consequences opens the door to a host of problems. One such problem is acknowledged by Jackson in a footnote on p. 471, though he apparently doesn't see it as a problem: under consequentialism, one can do the right thing for the wrong reason. Conversely, it is possible for an agent to perform all of the required calculations to determine what one ought to do, perform the required action, and then by luck of a bad or unintended consequence (perhaps the result of insufficient information in making the calculation?) be judged morally blameworthy for the negative consequence. Though some may be willing to swallow this pill and accept that judgments of moral responsibility need not be in accordance with justice, I cannot. Perhaps consequentialism has a use in the moral significance realm of morality, but clearly an intention-based system of judgment is necessary when assigning moral responsibility.